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A B S T R A C T
Background: A widespread sense of a failing criminal justice system and increased feelings of insecurity
changed the response to crime into a culture of control, which is characterized by policies that punish and
exclude. In the Netherlands, these inﬂuences can be witnessed in the war on drugs where local
authorities use their administrative power to close homes involved in drug-related crime. Citizens can
invoke judicial review over these administrative interferences by claiming that such closure results in an
unfair balance between purposes, means and consequences. This paper assesses whether judicial review
functions as a safety net against losing one’s home due to drug-related crime.
Methods: We used doctrinal legal research methods to examine the “law in the books” and empirical legal
research methods to analyse the “law in action”. We used a survey to investigate how often the drug-
related closure power was used in 2015, and we statistically analysed all published case law of Dutch
lower courts between 2007 and 2016.
Results: The scope of the closure power broadened over the years and our data show that local authorities
ﬁercely make use of this instrument. In 41.4% of the cases, citizens are successful in ﬁghting the closure.
While scholarly literature indicates that judicial courts function as safeguards by questioning the
proportionality of administrative action, raising a proportionality defence does not necessarily result in a
more favourable outcome for citizens. In fact, raising a proportionality defence makes it more likely to
result in dismissal of the appeal.
Conclusion: The stretched scope of the drug-related closure power together with the relatively low
success rate of citizens who ﬁght the loss of their home and a seemingly meaningless proportionality
check show no sign of a safety net against the loss of one’s home at the suit of a local authority.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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The global war on drugs is predominantly fought using criminal
law; those who sell or possess illicit drugs are arrested by the
police, prosecuted, and ﬁned or imprisoned by a criminal court
(Trebach, 1988; Stevenson, 2011). Nevertheless, research shows
that current reliance on criminal law enforcement is resulting in an
array of negative unintended consequences (ICSDP, 2010) such as
the increase of risks to public health, the creation of a criminal
market, the subversion of social and economic growth, the
enrichment of criminals, and the stigmatisation and discrimina-
tion of people who use drugs (UNODC, 2008; Rolles et al., 2016).
Unsurprisingly, many countries are moving towards less
punitive regimes (Room, Fischer, Hall, Lenton, & Reuter, 2010,* Corresponding author.
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(Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2016). Portugal, for example,
no longer resorts to criminal penalties when it comes to low-level
drug possession (Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2016), and
Canada is taking serious steps to legalize recreational cannabis
(Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2016; Austin, 2017). Moreover,
jurisdictions such as Uruguay and several states in the United
States already ofﬁcially allow recreational cannabis markets
(Davies, 2016; Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2016; Godlee
& Hurley, 2016). The Netherlands drew away from a punitive
prohibition style four decades ago by de facto legalizing personal
possession of all drugs and small retail for cannabis (WODC, 2009).
These widespread developments combined with recent calls for a
global drug policy reform suggest that the global war on drugs
might be sputtering to a close (Godlee & Hurley, 2016; UNGASS,
2016a, 2016b; Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2016; APPGDPR,
2017).
Another widespread reaction to the shortcomings of criminal
law has taken the opposite direction of the trend towards lessder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
2 Throughout the article, the term “local authority” will be used to describe the
authority entitled with this power while it is ofﬁcially the (in Dutch:) burgemeester.
In the Netherlands, a burgemeester is a non-elected administrative authority
appointed by the national government. The burgemeester chairs both the executive
board and legislative council of a municipality, and is responsible for safety and
public order. The title for burgemeester is sometimes translated as “mayor” or as
“burgomaster” to emphasize the signiﬁcant difference between the Dutch mayor
and the British mayor. However, unfamiliarity of the Dutch concept burgemeester in
international context and the – in our view – lack of proper translation induced us to
use the term local authorities throughout the article.
3 In 2016, the housing stock in the Netherlands included 7.641.323 premises;
56.2% were owner-occupied and the other part of the housing market were mainly
rental premises. Roughly 30% of all rental premises were owned by private
landlords, and the vast majority were rent out by housing associations (Statline CBS,
2016). According to the Housing Act 2015, all housing associations must rent the
majority of their premises to people with a relatively low annual income.
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insecurity, and a widespread sense of a failing criminal justice
system changed the discourse on crime and crime control over the
last thirty years and resulted in a “culture of control” (Garland,
2001). The culture of control is, amongst others, characterized by
policies that punish and exclude, and measures that seriously
intervene in individual’s freedoms and autonomy (Garland, 2001).
This changed discourse on crime and crime control leads to social
and racial division, decreased tolerance and mass imprisonment
(Garland, 2001).
While Garland (2001), in his book “The Culture of Control”,
focusses on the United Kingdom and the United States, myriad
scholars illustrate that a culture of control is witnessed throughout
many Western countries, for example in Continental Europe (for
the Netherlands and Belgium see e.g., Van Swaaningen, 2004;
Snacken, 2007; Devroe, 2012; Devroe, Bruinsma, & Vander Beken,
2017; for broader – comparative – analyses on countries such as
Germany, Italy, France, Denmark see e.g., Welch & Schuster, 2005;
Muncie, 2008). Moreover, though Garland describes the culture of
control from a criminal law perspective, his theory is often used to
interpret the origins and subsequent developments of tough on
crime policies built around civil or administrative law (Devroe,
2012; Di Ronco & Persâk, 2014; Devroe et al., 2017).
The use of civil or administrative law to tackle crime or
disorderly behaviour relates to what Garland (2001) calls the
“responsibilisation strategy”. This is a widespread regulatory
trend to mobilize other actors than judicial authorities and the
police to tackle criminal or disorderly behaviour (Garland, 2001;
Beckett & Herbert, 2009; Devroe, 2012). In many jurisdictions,
local authorities have increasingly been empowered with
intrusive and sometimes even punitive measures to circumvent
criminal law safeguards and time-consuming  criminal proceed-
ings (for the Netherlands see e.g., Ferdinandusse, 2016; Tops &
Tromp, 2017; De Meijer, 2017; for United Kingdom see e.g.,
Burney, 1999; Hansen, Bill, & Pease, 2003; Crawford, 2009; for
the United States see e.g., Cheh, 1991; Beckett & Herbert, 2009;
Torres, Apkarian, & Hawdon, 2016). In the United States, for
example, local authorities and criminal justice ofﬁcials have
drawn upon various “banishment strategies” to address criminal
behaviour (Cheh, 1991; Beckett & Herbert, 2009; Torres et al.,
2016). Comparable tactics are deployed in the United Kingdom
using Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (Burney, 1999; Crawford,
2009; Crawford, 2011). Germany (Von Mahs, 2005; Belina,
2007), Belgium (Devroe, 2012; Peršak, 2016), South-Africa and
the Netherlands (Fick & Vols, 2016; Vols & Fick, 2017) all have
similar exclusion-based instruments. Especially the use of
eviction1 for excluding or banishing people to combat crime
and disorderly behaviour has become increasingly popular
(Hunter & Nixon, 2001; Hunter, Nixon, & Slatter, 2005; Flint,
2006; Varady & Schulman, 2007; Flint & Pawson, 2009; Yau,
2011; Silva, 2015; Vols, Tassenaar, & Jacobs, 2015; Fée, 2016;
Kenna, Benjaminsen, Busch-Geertsema, & Nasarre-Aznar, 2016;
Vols & Fick, 2017).
Our paper holds that these inﬂuences of the culture of control
(i.e. the shift to non-criminal law sanctions and the accompanying
responsibilisation strategy) can also be witnessed in the war on
drugs. Many jurisdictions use intrusive and/or punitive measures
based on civil or administrative law as an alternative or
supplement to criminal justice intervention (for the United
States see e.g., Fagan, Davies, Holland, & Dumanovsky, 2005;
Lebovits & Seidman, 2007; Dickinson, 2015; for the United1 In this paper, eviction refers the permanent or temporary removal of
individuals, families or communities from their homes against their will (UN-
HABITAT, 2007).Kingdom see e.g., Flint, 2002; Brown, 2004; Eastwood, 2015). In
the Netherlands, one such jurisdiction and the focus of this paper,
the responsibility for drug-related crime control has progressive-
ly shifted towards local authorities.2 Under Article 13b of the
Dutch anti-drugs Act – the Opium Act – local authorities have the
power to close homes and other premises if they are used as
illegal sites for drug-related crime (Vols & Bruijn, 2015). This
instrument addresses all types of drugs and is tenure neutral as
both rental and owner-occupied premises are subject to closure.
Moreover, Article 13b Opium Act subjects both public and non-
public premises to closure. Yet, this paper focusses merely on the
closure of homes.3
A closure is characterized as a restorative measure instead of a
punitive sanction and is therefore temporary – about three to
twelve months (Vols & Bruijn, 2015). In theory, this means that one
can continue his or her residence after the closure period has
expired. Yet, despite the provisional nature of the closure, the
consequences are not necessarily temporary. Closing one’s home
and the following eviction can have immense negative con-
sequences. An emerging body of research focusses on the negative
effects of eviction on one’s physical and mental health and show
how losing one’s home often causes stress, unhappiness, and
disrupts the lives of the residents (Kearns, Hiscock, Ellaway, &
Macintyre, 2000; Nettleton, 2001; Bright, 2010; Currie & Tekin,
2015; Burgard, Seefeldt, & Zelner, 2012; Desmond & Kimbro, 2015;
Desmond, 2016). Moreover, closing one’s home due to drug-related
crime can lead to placement on a tenant blacklist, or even
homelessness as local authorities are not required to provide
alternative living arrangements after closing one’s home (ECLI:NL:
RVS:2016:2464; ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:2840).4 Additionally, housing
associations may cancel a lease without judicial intervention after
a drug-related closure (Brouwer & Schilder, 2011, p. 322; Vols,
2015), and in case of an owner-occupied residence, banks may
require that homeowners pay off their mortgage loan at once after
a drug-related closure. The house will be auctioned if the owner is
ﬁnancially unable to do so (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2003). Thus,
while the closure lasts temporarily, the consequences are often
continuous.
A closure order can be fought by ﬁling a notice of objection with
the local authority that issued the order (Article 7:1 General
Administrative Law Act). The local authority will then reconsider
the closure order. If it considers the objection unfounded, the
citizen may then ﬁle a notice of appeal with the district court
(Article 8:1 General Administrative Law Act). Rulings of district
courts are open to higher appeal at the highest administrative4 Throughout this paper, all case law is referred to using the European Case Law
Identiﬁer (ECLI). ECLI is an identiﬁer for case law in Europa and consists of ﬁve
components. The ﬁrst part is the acronym “ECLI”, the second part is the country
code, followed by the code of the court, year of the decision, and unique identifying
number. For more information on the ECLI, visit the ofﬁcial website of the European
Union on European Union law (eur-lex.europe.eu).
5 For long, cannabis was the only “soft drug”, but nowadays the Opium Act
includes more than 250 different soft drugs. Yet, coffeeshops are only allowed to sell
cannabis products.
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of the Council of State (the Council of State).
As this instrument operates under administrative law the
closure power will not be encumbered by criminal law safeguards.
The presumption of innocence (Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights) is, for instance, bypassed when
operating under administrative law, and the burden of proof in
administrative law is less strict than under criminal law (Bröring &
Jurgens, 2006; Ashworth & Zedner, 2008, p. 48). However, the
consequences of closing one’s home show signs of endangered
individual’s rights and freedoms, and despite the fewer legal
safeguards under administrative law it is still the task of judicial
courts to protect these rights and freedoms (Ewing, 2010; De
Waard, 2016).
In response to the emerging culture of control and the
subsequent empowerment of local authorities to subject criminal
or disorderly behaviour to intrusive measures, previous scholarly
research focused on legal protection provided by judicial courts
against interferences by local authorities in individual’s rights and
freedoms. For example, Di Ronco and Peršak (2014) show that
courts provide certain legal protection, arising, inter alia, from case
law of the European Court of Human Rights (European Court). The
European Court deems that any person at the risk of losing one’s
home should “in principle be able to have the proportionality and
reasonableness of the measure determined by an independent
tribunal in the light of the relevant principles under Article 8 of the
Convention, notwithstanding that, under domestic law, his right of
occupation has come to an end” (ECLI:CE:ECHR:2008:0513-
JUD001900904).
In light of the above, we will assess whether Dutch judicial
courts function as a substantial safeguard against losing one’s
home due to drug-related crime at the suit of a local authority. In
order to do this, we apply two different research methods. First, we
use doctrinal legal research methods to examine the “law in the
books” (Pound, 1910). We will give an overview of the Dutch drug
policy and the use of the closure power under Article 13b Opium
Act to deepen our understanding of this relatively unknown aspect
of the Dutch war on drugs. Whereas much research has already
been conducted on the drug policy in the Netherlands (e.g.,
Erickson, Leuw, & Marshall, 1994; MacCoun & Reuter, 1997;
Ossebaard & Van de Wijngaart, 1998; Boekhout van Solinge, 1999;
Korf, 2002; Uitermark, 2004; Reinarman, 2009; Van Ooyen-
Houben & Kleemans, 2015; Van Laar, Van der Pol, & Niesink, 2016;
Van Ooyen-Houben, Bieleman, & Korf, 2016), the power of local
authorities to ﬁght the war on drugs by closing homes received
little to no attention within international scholarly literature.
Secondly, we use empirical legal research methods to examine
the “law in action” (Pound, 1910). We used a survey to investigate
how often the closure power under Article 13b Opium Act was
utilized in 2015. Moreover, we statistically analysed all published
case law of Dutch lower courts to examine judicial behaviour in
cases where citizens appeal their closure order. While Article 13b
Opium Act can be used to close down any type of premises (Bruijn
& Vols, 2017), this paper focusses merely on the closure of homes.
Law in the books: analysis of the Dutch drug policy and
legislation
Research methods
The analysis below is based on doctrinal legal research
(Westerman, 2011), which means that we studied law and legal
concepts by reading and analysing literature, legislation, and case
law to establish “the nature and parameters” of the law and legal
issues involved (Hutchinson & Duncan, 2012; Hutchinson, 2010, p.
37). Doctrinal legal research distinguishes itself from quantitativeresearch since law is not datum that can be presented numerically
or subjected to statistical testing like quantitative research does
with data (McCrudden, 2006; Walter, 2010). Doctrinal analysis is
also different from content analysis as the role of the researcher is
important to synthesise meaning from texts (Hutchinson, &
Duncan, 2012). Doctrinal research can use content analysis to
deconstruct texts, but it is more than an “analysis of documents
and texts that seeks to quantify content in terms of predetermined
categories” (Bryman, 2008, p. 692). The importance of the role of
the researcher and the need for interpretation and analysing to
construct meaning are qualitative aspects of doctrinal legal
research (Hutchinson & Duncan, 2012). Yet, doctrinal methodology
is unique and different from all other social scientiﬁc methods as it
focusses on legal principles developed by the courts and the
legislature (Bartie, 2010, p. 350). Doctrinal research makes a clear
distinction between legal norms or standards and the facts of the
situation. Moreover, in contrast to most other social sciences,
doctrinal research lacks an independent theoretical perspective;
the law is seen as both the object of research and the theoretical
perspective from which the object is studied (Westerman, 2011).
In this paper, we critically assessed essential features of
legislation, legal policy documents, and case law, after which all
the relevant elements were synthesised “to establish an arguably
correct and complete statement of the law on the matter in hand”
(Hutchinson, 2013, p. 9–10). Our doctrinal analysis consists of three
elements. First, relevant Dutch legislation was gathered and
analysed using the website https://zoek.ofﬁcielebekendmakingen.
nl, which contains all legislation from 1995 until present.
Legislation before 1995 was found using Dutch online databases
such as Legal Intelligence, Kluwer Navigator, and Rechtsorde. These
databases were searched using keywords such as “Article 13b
Opium Act” and “drug policy”. Second, we collected and analysed
the relevant research literature using electronic databases such as
Lexis-Nexis, Google Scholar, Elsevier, and Wiley, as well as article
reference lists. Search terms included “war on drugs”, “drug-
related eviction(s)”, “drug-related crime”, “Article 13b Opium Act”,
“Damocles Act”, and “right to housing”. Each database was
searched for English and Dutch language articles on the Dutch
drug policy and the ﬁght of local authorities against drug-related
crime. The databases were searched from its inception to its most
recent update as of January 2017. Third, the online database of the
Dutch judiciary, www.rechtspraak.nl; was used to gather all
relevant published Dutch case law, using the following search
terms: “Article 13b Opium Act”, “eviction” and “drug-related
closure”. All indicated search terms are English translations of the
Dutch terms.
Dutch tolerance policy
The key element of the Dutch drug policy is that any person
above the age of 18 can buy cannabis in tolerated outlets known as
coffeeshops. Yet, while cities such as Amsterdam and Maastricht
are famous for their coffeeshops, cannabis sale and possession are
ofﬁcially criminal offences under Dutch law (Article 3 Opium Act).
This illustrates a system of de facto legalization and de jure
prohibition (Ossebaard & Van de Wijngaart, 1998; De Kort &
Cramer, 1999).
This policy, also known as “the tolerance policy”, has its roots in
a desire to separate cannabis (soft drugs5) from drugs with
unacceptable risks for public health (hard drugs). To prevent
cannabis from becoming a gateway drug, the Dutch government
140 L.M. Bruijn et al. / International Journal of Drug Policy 51 (2018) 137–147decided in 1976 to ofﬁcially tolerate the sale and possession of
cannabis (WODC, 2009, pp. 50–51). Such policy is possible under
the legal “expediency principle”. This principle empowers the
Public Prosecutor in the Netherlands to refrain from prosecution if
it is “in the public interest” (Duncan & Nicholson, 1997; Chatwin,
2003; Corstens, 2014, p. 41). This means that illegality does not
automatically result in repressive law enforcement (Uitermark,
2004). The expediency principle, hence, enables the Public
Prosecutor to withdraw from investigation and prosecution of
cannabis sale and possession (Ossebaard & Van de Wijngaart,
1998). Thus, the sale and possession of cannabis remain ofﬁcially
illegal under Dutch law, but are tolerated as a matter of
government policy.
Under current national drug policy, drug possession for
personal use is tolerated up to a maximum of half a gram of
hard drugs, ﬁve grams of soft drugs, or ﬁve cannabis plants
(Aanwijzing, 2015). Moreover, coffeeshop owners will not be
prosecuted for selling cannabis as long as they comply with the
following set of rules: they must refrain from advertising and
marketing, selling hard drugs and alcohol, causing public distur-
bance in their vicinity, and selling to minors and non-Dutch
residents. Moreover, a coffeeshop’s stock should be limited to ﬁve
hundred grams, and sale transactions should not exceed ﬁve grams
per costumer per day (Wouters, Benschop, & Korf, 2010;
Aanwijzing, 2015; Bruijn & Vols, 2017). These rules have developed
over a number of years by the national legislature, local govern-
ments and the Public Prosecution Service (Van der Veen, 2002).
In the early days of the tolerance policy, few rules regulating the
upcoming drug market existed and the number of coffeeshops
grew exponentially, which in turn had a signiﬁcant impact on
public order and the quality of life in local communities (Breunese,
Brouwer, & Schilder, 1996; Van Rest & Visser, 1996; Uitermark,
2004). Many people complained about unpleasant smells, higher
trafﬁc volume, pollution, unlawful assembly, noise nuisance, and
feelings of insecurity (Bieleman, Schakel, De Bie, & Snippe, 1995).
Consequently, rules on coffeeshops became more stringent
(Uitermark, 2004; MacCoun, 2011, p. 1900) and enforcement
became subject to administrative public order law. As such, local
authorities started to play a key role in the enforcement of the
national drug policy (Breunese et al., 1996).
These serious problems caused by coffeeshops led in 1996 to a
change in the national drug policy, which empowered local
authorities to ban coffeeshops within their jurisdictions (Breunese
et al.,1996; Bruijn & Post, 2017). Furthermore, the legislatureentitled
local authorities in 1999 to close down coffeeshops for non-
compliance with the rules under which they are tolerated. This same
provision, Article 13b Opium Act, authorizes local authorities to close
public premises used for illegal drug trades (Richtlijnen, 1996;
Aanwijzing, 2000). The possibility to bancoffeeshops and the closure
power introduced in 1999 (Article 13b Opium Act) seemed to cause a
rapid decline in the number of coffeeshops. The peak in the number
of coffeeshops is estimated at 1450, but by the end of 1999 the
number of coffeeshops dropped to 846 (Bieleman & Goeree, 2000;
Bieleman, Mennes, & Sijtstra, 2014).
Despite this decline in number of coffeeshops and the power to
tackle illegal drug stores, the quality of life in residential areas was
still degrading (Kamerstukken, 2005/2006; Kamerstukken, 2006/
2007). According to the government, residential premises were
increasingly used as drug outlets, which led to nuisance,
disturbance of public order, and unsafe living conditions (Kamer-
stukken, 2005/2006; Kamerstukken, 2006/2007). This was an
incentive for the legislature to extent the scope of the closure
power under Article 13b Opium Act in 2007 with homes and other
non-public premises (Kamerstukken, 2005/2006). Ever since, local
authorities are entitled to close down both public and non-public
premises, including private housing, if illicit drugs are sold,delivered, provided, or present for one of these purposes in or near
a property.
Article 13b Opium Act: closing illegal drug outlets
Both the introduction of the closure power under Article 13b
Opium Act in 1999 and the subsequent amendment in 2007 were
originally intended to close sites involved in illegal drug trade and
to tackle coffeeshops that violate the tolerance conditions
(Kamerstukken, 1996/1997; Kamerstukken, 2005/2006). Yet, case
law shows that the scope of the closure power has broadened and
that its use intensiﬁed over the past years (Brouwer & Bruijn, 2016).
Under current Dutch law, the closure power is no longer limited
to illegal drug outlets; local authorities may issue a closure order if
the quantity of discovered drugs exceeds the tolerated amount for
personal use (half a gram of hard drugs, ﬁve grams of soft drugs, or
ﬁve cannabis plants). According to the highest administrative court
in the Netherlands (the Council of State), any amount of drugs
above these thresholds for personal use is a trading volume used
for commercial activities such as dealing or transporting drugs
(ECLI:NL:RVS:2015:130).
Furthermore, from its inception Article 13b Opium Act was
explicitly not intended as an instrument to close down cannabis
farms or marijuana growing facilities (Kamerstukken, 2006/
2007a). Yet, in 2013, the Council of State held that any amount
of cannabis plants above the tolerated amount for personal use –
ﬁve plants – is probably used for commercial activities and hence
subject to the closure power under Article 13b Opium Act (ECLI:NL:
RVS:2013:2362). Since then, this provision has been used to tackle
growing facilities (Brouwer & Bruijn, 2016).
Similarly, when Article 13b Opium Act was introduced the
legislature clariﬁed that the closure power should be used as a last
resort. A less intrusive measure, such as a ﬁnal warning or a
penalty, should always precede a closure order. The only accepted
exemption is a “serious offense” (Kamerstukken, 2006/2007b;
Kamerstukken, 2006/2007c). Yet, in 2012, the Council of State
approved a “one strike you are out-policy” with regard to hard drug
violations. This policy of the municipality of Kerkrade is to
immediately close a building after the discovery of hard drugs
without a prior warning. The Council of State reasoned that any
activity relating to hard drugs is a serious offence, which justiﬁes
such immediate closures (ECLI:NL:RVS:2012:BY4412). In 2015, the
Council of State approved the policy of a municipality that
abandons the requirement of a prior warning in cases where more
than twenty cannabis plants are discovered (ECLI:NL:
RVS:2015:130). In 2016, the Council of State took it a step further
and approved a local one strike you are out-policy with regard to all
drugs. The Council of State approved this policy by reasoning,
analogous to its judgement in 2012, that commercial possession of
soft drugs is a serious offence and hence subject to immediate
closure (ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:950).
These developments in case law show that the scope of the
drug-related closure power has broadened over the years and
illustrate the contradictions between its initial purpose and its use
in practice. Whilst this increased scope together with the
acceptance of a one strike-policy created an instrument that
quickly tackles all sorts of drug-related activities, it also created a
seemingly harsh measure considering that the use of this power
results in the eviction of entire households regardless of whether
the drug-related activity was engaged in by tenants, owner
occupiers, or other residents including minors (Vols & Bruijn,
2015). Yet, as the closure power under Article 13b Opium Act
operates under administrative law, citizens lack legal safeguards
provided by criminal law. This raises the question whether a legal
barrier exists against this repressive instrument used to ﬁght the
war on drugs.
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The war on drugs in the Netherlands is increasingly fought
without the use of criminal law as drug-related crime is
increasingly subject to the administrative closure power of local
authorities. This is problematic from a legal point of view as losing
one’s home is characterized as “a most extreme form of
interference with the right to respect for the home” by the
European Court (ECLI:CE:ECHR:2008:0513JUD001900904).
According to the European Court, every home occupier derives
protection from the right to respect for the home found in Article
8 ECHR. Contracting parties to the ECHR should ensure that anyone
who is at risk of being evicted from his or her home at the suit of a
local authority should have the right to raise the question of
proportionality and reasonableness of the measure in front of an
independent tribunal in light of Article 8 ECHR (ECLI:CE:
ECHR:2008:0513JUD001900904; ECLI:CE:ECHR:2009:1022-
JUD000357206; ECLI:CE:ECHR:2011:0203JUD000657104). All
Member States of the Council of Europe have to comply with
this minimum level of protection against the loss of the home
(Kenna & Gailiute, 2013; Vols, Kiehl, & Sidoli del Ceno, 2015).
In these cases, the European Court referred to the proportion-
ality principle, which is, in short, a gateway for citizens to request
legal protection against the use of administrative powers such as
the closure power under Article 13b Opium Act. The German
scholar Fleiner clariﬁed the meaning of the proportionality
principle with the famous example “the police should not shoot
at sparrows with cannons” (Fleiner, 1928, p. 440). Although the
exact meaning of proportionality is subject of ﬁerce academic
debate (Barak, 2012), the general underlying idea of proportional-
ity is that purposes, means, and consequences should be balanced
(Fick & Vols, 2016). For instance, the purpose of closing a home
after drugs are discovered is to terminate the illegal activity, to
prevent further violations, and restore the peace and public order
in the neighbourhood (Vols & Bruijn, 2015; Bröring et al., 2016, p.
599). If the closure extends further than these purposes, one
speaks of “disproportionality” between the sanction imposed and
the offence committed (De Waard, 2016). Furthermore, a
proportionality review involves balancing the public interests
against the interests and rights of the individuals involved
(Ranchordás & de Waard, 2016).
Under administrative Dutch law, citizens are required to follow
a preliminary administrative procedure before they have the
possibility of having the proportionality and reasonableness of the
eviction determined by an independent court in light of Article
8 ECHR. Citizens should complain about the closure order to the
local authority who issued the closure order before they can appeal
the order in front of a judicial court (Article 7:1 of the General
Administrative Law Act). This is called the objection procedure.
After the local authority reconsidered its order, citizens are entitled
to invoke judicial review and have the possibility of a proportion-
ality check by a judicial court under the General Administrative
Law Act (Article 3:4 (2)). Yet, it is unclear how Dutch courts handle
proportionality defences in cases where citizens appeal their drug-
related closure orders. Hence, next part of the paper focusses on
the law in action by statistically analysing all published case law of
Dutch lower courts on the use of Article 13b Opium Act.
Law in action: judicial behaviour on the administrative war on
drugs
Analysis of the law in the books showed that local authorities in
the Netherlands are empowered to ﬁght the war on drugs by
immediately closing homes involved in drug-related crime. In
return, citizens have the possibility to request judicial review of
such administrative actions under both Dutch and European law.One of the most important grounds for judicial review is the
proportionality principle. Previous scholarly literature indicated
that judicial courts “may well be regarded as fundamental to the
safeguarding of individual rights and freedoms” by, amongst
others, questioning the proportionality of the interferences by
local authorities (Di Ronco & Peršak, 2014). To examine if courts
indeed function as a safety net against the loss of one’s home at the
suit of a local authority, the following part of the paper focusses on
the law in action by using quantitative empirical (legal) research
methods (Loevinger, 1948; Epstein & King, 2002; Hall & Wright,
2008; Epstein & Martin, 2010; Lawless, Robbennolt, & Ulen, 2010;
Epstein & Martin, 2014).
Research methods
The ﬁrst empirical research method we used was a survey to
indicate how often local authorities use their closure power. A
survey was sent to forty municipalities with the largest population
in the Netherlands and ten randomly selected municipalities (Vols,
Hof, & Brouwer, 2017). These municipalities were, inter alia, asked
to provide data on the usage frequency of the closure power under
Article 13b Opium Act over 2015. This resulted in the data on drug-
related closures from 46 municipalities (not all municipalities
responded).
The second empirical research method we used was a
quantitative analysis of Dutch case law regarding the closure of
homes based on Article 13b Opium Act. We collected and
statistically analysed all published case law between November
2007 and January 2016 on home closures based on Article 13b
Opium Act. We chose November 2007 as a starting point since the
scope of the provision was formally expanded with the power to
close homes and other non-public premises at that time. We
searched the online database of the Dutch judiciary (www.
rechtspraak.nl) with ﬁxed search terms in order to ensure
reproducibility. We used the following terms: “13b Opium Act”,
“closure”, “13b Opium Act closure”. This database allowed us to
automatically ﬁlter on all judgements of the lowest courts – the
district courts – on administrative law, and we manually selected
all judgements on home closures. This search yielded 87 relevant
court decisions on the closure of homes based on Article 13b
Opium Act in the period from November 2007 to January 2016.
This sample of 87 court decisions is a selection of the overall
population of judgements from 2007 to 2016 as district courts in
the Netherlands do not publish every single judgement. To assess
the representativeness of our sample, we examined the ofﬁcial
policy of www.rechtspraak.nl (Besluit selectiecriteria, 2012). We
discovered that the judiciary itself selects which court decision will
be published and that the rules for publication are rather vague.
Until 2012, court decisions were published on the basis of
qualitative criteria including media attention, importance for
public life, consequences for application of regulations, and
interests of parties. As of 2012, certain decisions should always
be published, for example judgments of all highest courts “if the
case is not unfounded or inadmissible and/or dismissed with a
standard reasoning” (Besluit selectiecriteria, 2012). A court
decision should also be published if a case received attention
from the media or if the decision holds a signiﬁcant importance for
further rulings. The rules on publication contain some more
selection criteria, and courts are also allowed to develop additional
rules and selection criteria.
We hand-coded all cases to document the trends in case law
and the factors that might appear important to the outcomes of
cases (Hall & Wright, 2008; Lawless et al., 2010). Each case was
coded by the same author to prevent multiple interpretations. All
published case law was printed out and coded into a computer. We
developed a codebook based on our readings of case law, which
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such as the type of drug-related crime, the defences advanced by
the citizens, and the reasoning of the court. The codebook includes
a detailed description of how to code, read and interpret the
judgements.
Lastly, the collected data were statistically analysed. We used
Fisher’s Exact Test (two-tailed) because of the relatively small
sample (N = 87) to determine the probability (p-value) that a given
pattern in the data is obtained merely by chance. Fisher’s Exact Test
calculates the deviation from the null hypothesis assuming there is
no relationship between variables. The null hypothesis is rejected if
the p-value is below 0.05 (Lawless et al., 2010; Epstein & Martin,
2014). We used the phi coefﬁcient (F) to determine the strength of
a relationship between variables as phi is commonly used in
2  2 contingency tables (Ellis, 2010). Phi ranges in value from
1 to 1, where 1 is a perfect relationship and indicates that most
of the data are in the off-diagonal cells, 0 indicates no relationship
and 1 indicates a perfect relationship with most of the data in the
diagonal cells (Sirkin, 2006).
Results of survey
Fig. 1 shows that 39 of the 46 (84.8%) municipalities in our
sample used the closure power under Article 13b Opium Act in
2015. In total, these local authorities closed 602 premises. The
frequency of using this closure power differentiates heavily among
the municipalities (M = 13.09 Mdn = 3.00, SD = 19.13).
Local authorities can use the closure power to close public
premises, such as coffeeshops and restaurants, as well as private
premises such as homes. Of the 46 municipalities who responded
to the survey, 38 provided information on the number of homes
they closed. Fig. 2 shows the distribution of home closures in 2015.Fig. 1. Distribution of closed premises among municipalities in 2015 (n = 46).
Fig. 2. Distribution of closed homes among municipalities in 2015 (n = 38).The 38 municipalities that provided their data on home closures
closed 239 homes in 2015 using the closure power under Article
13b Opium Act. The frequency of using the closure power differs
heavily among the municipalities (M = 6.29, Mdn=0.50, SD = 11.49).
Fig. 2 shows that half of the 38 municipalities in our sample
refrained from closing homes in 2015. Consequently, 19 municipal-
ities are responsible for the 239 home closures in 2015.
Results of quantitative analysis of case law
Our sample of Dutch case law contains 87 court decisions from
November 2007 to January 2016 on drug-related home closures.
The length of the closures in our sample varies between 3 and
12 months (M = 6.45, Mdn = 6.00, SD = 4.83).
Table 1 shows that local authorities refer to ﬁve types of drug-
related activities to support their closure order: possession of
drugs for commercial purposes, growing over ﬁve cannabis plants,
dealing drugs from or around the premises, keeping a cannabis
“stash” for a coffeeshop, and producing drugs in a so-called drug
lab. Drug possession is seen as commercial possession once it
exceeds the tolerated amount for personal use (half a gram of hard
drugs, ﬁve grams of soft drugs, or ﬁve cannabis plants).
Commercial possession is the reason to close a home in almost
half of the cases (see Table 1), and dealing drugs from or around the
house leads to a closure order in 10.3% of the cases.
Citizens use different arguments to oppose a closure order.
Table 2 shows that in 45 cases citizens argue that the requirements
of Article 13b Opium Act were not met, i.e. the local authority was
not entitled to issue a closure order. Moreover, the table shows that
citizens consider the closure as punishment in 17 cases; citizens
claim that closing their home is a punitive sanction intended to
punish them rather than a restorative measure intended to end the
violation. The court accepts this defence in 1 case, as shown in
Table 2.
Furthermore, citizens argue that the closure order is inade-
quately reasoned by the local authority. They claim that the
decision lacks supporting substantiation on the urgency to close
their home and claim that the local authority should have
mentioned the reasons why a less drastic remedy is insufﬁcient.
The insufﬁcient reasoning of the closure order is a reason to allow
the appeal in 22 cases out of 36 allowed appeals. Its role in deciding
to allow an appeal is marginally statistically signiﬁcant in
comparison to other defences (p = 0.09).
As illustrated in our doctrinal legal analysis, proportionality
defences are a gateway to judicial review of administrative actions.
Our analysis shows that citizens raise a proportionality defence in
the vast majority of the cases (78 out of 87 cases). However, Table 2
shows that this defence convinces the court in only 11 out of
78 cases.
Table 3 shows that the court allows the claim of the citizens in
36 cases (41.4%), which means that the appeals are dismissed in
more than half of all cases (51 cases of 87 cases). Moreover, Table 3
shows the impact of a proportionality defence on the court’s
reasoning in their judgements. Here, “impact” means that the courtTable 1
Reasons for closure and corresponding court decisions as a percentage of the
sample (N = 87).
Reason n (%) % Appeal
Allowed Dismissed
Commercial possession 42 (48.3) 37.5 67.5
Growing cannabis 33 (37.9) 54.5 45.5
Dealing drugs 9 (10.3) 33.3 66.7
Drug lab 1 (1.2) 0.0 100.0
Unknown 2 (2.3) 0.0 100.0
Table 2
Advanced defences versus frequency of acceptance by court, and number of times similar defence is reason to allow the appeal (N = 87).
Defence Advanced/Accepted Reason to allow appeal (n = 36) (%)
Disproportional consequences 78/11 14 (38.9)
Local authority has no jurisdiction 45/5 10 (27.8)
Insufﬁcient reasoning 18/7 22 (61.1)
Closure is a punitive sanction 17/1 1 (2.8)
Table 3
Proportionality defence and its impact on court decisions as a percentage of the sample.
Court decision Impact of proportionality defence on court decision Proportionality defence raised (%)
Yes No Total
Appeal allowed (n = 36) Impact 11 (30.6) 3 (8.3) 14 (38.9)
No impact 17 (47.2) 5 (13.9) 22 (61.1)
Total 28 (77.8) 8 (22.2) 36 (100.0)
Appeal dismissed (n = 51) Impact 50 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 50 (98.0)
No impact 0 (0.0) 1 (2.0) 1 (2.0)
Total 50 (98.0) 1 (2.0) 51 (100.0)
All (N = 87) Impact 61 (70.1)* 3 (3.4)* 64 (73.6)
No impact 17 (19.5)* 6 (6.9)* 23 (26.4)
Total 78 (89.7) 9 (10.3) 87 (100.0)
* p = 0.0092.
L.M. Bruijn et al. / International Journal of Drug Policy 51 (2018) 137–147 143includes the proportionality defence in its reasoning and explicitly
mentiones the (dis)proportionality of the closure order and its
consequences as a reason for its ﬁnal decision. Although a
proportionality defence got accepted in only 11 out of 78 cases
(14.1%), there is a moderate positive relationship between raising a
proportionality defence and its impact on the reasoning in a ﬁnal
court decision (p = 0.009, F = 0.31).
Raising a proportionality defence is reason for the court to allow
the appeal in 11 out of 28 cases in which the defence was raised,
and in 50 out of 50 cases reason to dismiss the appeal. In addition
to the positive relationship between raising a proportionality
defence and its impact on the reasoning in a court decision, we
found a signiﬁcant substantial negative relationship between
raising a proportionality defence and allowed appeals (p < 0.0001,
F = 0.53).
Discussion
We collected data on the number of drug-related closures in
2015 to provide some insights on the usage frequency of this
instrument. We also conducted a statistical analysis of all
published case law on the use of the closure power between
November 2007 and January 2016 to examine whether courts
function as a safety net against losing one’s home at the suit of a
local authority. We speciﬁcally focused on the proportionality
principle as one of the most important grounds for judicial review.
On the whole, the results from our survey showed that the
closure power under Article 13b Opium Act is frequently used in
2015. Our sample of 46 municipalities constitutes only 11.8% of all
municipalities in the Netherlands but nonetheless closed
602 premises over a period of one year.6 The number of closed
premises varies heavily among the municipalities in our sample.
These differences may be explained by the composition of our
sample. Municipalities such as Amsterdam and Maastricht with a
high coffeeshop density are more likely to encounter drug-related
crime than others. This is similar for municipalities close to the
international borders that draw many drug tourists from Germany,6 On January 1st 2016, the Netherlands had 390 municipalities.Belgium and France (Wouters et al., 2010; MacCoun, 2011), and for
municipalities in the Southern part of the Netherlands where the
authorities encounter extreme forms of drug crime and nuisance
(Tops & Tromp, 2017). This might explain why, for example,
Amsterdam, with 173 coffeeshops (Bieleman, Mennes, & Sijstra,
2017) and much drug tourism, closed 51 premises in 2015, while
Deventer, situated in the middle of the Netherlands with only four
coffeeshops (Bieleman et al., 2017), closed only one building in
2015. This does not necessarily suggest that there is less drug-
related crime in Deventer than in Amsterdam, but it might be that
Deventer suffers less from drug-nuisance and that local authorities
are hence less concerned with tackling drug-related crime than
those in Amsterdam. Another explanation might be the differences
in local policies. For example, local authorities in the one
municipality might see themselves as crime ﬁghters more than
others (Misérus & Zoetbrood, 2017).
The data showed that home closures constitute about a third of
all closures in 2015. A possible explanation for this relatively low
number might be that homes are less often used as sites for drug-
related crime than public premises. Another explanation might be
that local authorities are more likely to refrain from closing homes
as the interests at stake are often higher for individuals who will
lose their home compared to the interests at stake for someone
who’s restaurant or store will be closed. Nevertheless, the fact that
only 19 municipalities account for 239 closed homes and just 11.8%
(46) of all Dutch municipalities account for a total of 602 closed
premises over a period of one year, proves how immersed local
authorities are in the war on drugs. Subsequently, these results
illustrate the importance of a more detailed study on the use of this
closure power.
Although the quantitative case law analysis tells us nothing
about the legal disputes that were never ﬁled in court, and those
that have not been published, we believe that the analysed case law
is a valuable source, revealing information about an important
portion of the law in action. Moreover, we believe that an
examination of our sample is useful and increases our knowledge
and understanding on court legal reasoning and the function of
courts as safety nets in cases regarding drug-related closures in the
Netherlands. Nevertheless, given the above, the imprecise
publication policy of www.rechtspraak.nl and the role of the
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applied when generalizing the results beyond the sample
examined in this paper.
Our quantitative analysis of case law showed that 41.4% of all
cases resulted in allowed appeals. This success rate for citizens is
especially interesting in relation to the broadened scope of local
authorities’ closure power. Whilst the doctrinal analysis shows
that Article 13b Opium Act was originally intended as an
instrument to ﬁght illegal drug outlets, our empirical analysis
shows that only a small portion of all cases involve actual drug
dealing. Almost half of all cases involved commercial possession
and a slightly smaller portion involved growing cannabis. While
the legislature never intended for commercial possession and
growing cannabis to fall under the scope of the closure power,
today they account for almost all published cases brought before
court.
The relatively low success rate for citizens is striking both with
respect to the underlying drug-related activities of a closure, as
well as the number of received warnings. Closure orders were only
preceded by warnings or other less intrusive measures in 5.7% of all
cases, and lack of a prior warning or other measure was only reason
to end a closure in 4.6% of all cases. These ﬁndings not only show
that local authorities apply a one strike you are out-approach, but
also that courts do not disapprove of such an approach. Lack of
prior warnings in the analysed cases might indicate that serious
violations with large quantities of drugs are overrepresented in our
sample. However, the Council of State actively approved the one
strike you are out-policy of the municipality of Venlo in 2016 (ECLI:
NL:RVS:2016:950), which supports the idea that, despite the
legislature’s intention, immediate closure is developing into the
rule rather than the exception. This development, together with
the other developments shown by the doctrinal analysis regarding
the ongoing widening of the scope of the closure power, will likely
result in a decrease of successful defences for citizens. This makes
us draw the cautious prediction that the number of allowed
appeals may drop in the future.
Table 2 showed the defences put forward by citizens in court.
We speciﬁcally focussed on the impact of proportionality defences
as previous scholarly literature indicated that the proportionality
principle is one of the most important grounds for judicial review
and one of the most important factors in protecting individual
rights and freedoms against excessive interference by local
authorities (Di Ronco & Peršak, 2014). The results showed that
proportionality defences are put forward in the vast majority of all
cases. Our analysis of case law and earlier studies on drug-related
closures (Vols & Bruijn, 2015; Bruijn & Vols, 2017) show that a
proportionality defence breaks-up in a wide range of arguments
such as physical or mental health problems, lack of a prior warning,
and ﬁnancial implications of the closure. A proportionality defence
can also include the consequences of the closure for minor
children, or the argument that a closure will result in homeless-
ness, placement on a tenant blacklist, or both.
Our data showed that none of the defences seem statistically
signiﬁcantly successful in court, not even a proportionality
defence. Proportionality defences were only successful in 11 out
of 78 cases (14.1%) in which the defence was put forward. Yet, our
analysis shows that, despite the case outcome, raising a
proportionality defence makes it more likely that the court
explicitly mentions the (dis)proportionality of the closure and its
consequences as a reason for its ﬁnal decision. This does not only
mean that the court balances the consequences of the closure and
interests of the citizen against the purpose of the closure to decide
whether the closure is proportional in a particular case, but also
that the outcome of this balancing will directly impact the court
decision. Moreover, while the court can decide to review the
proportionality of the closure on its own initiative, not raising aproportionality defence makes it more likely that the judge does
not assess the proportionality of the closure order and its
consequences at all. In other words, it is likely that the
proportionality of the closure and its consequences will not have
any impact on the court decision if a proportionality defence is not
put forward.
Thus, despite its function as a gateway to judicial review, the
fact that it was put forward in the vast majority of the analysed
cases, and its impact on court decisions, a proportionality defence
does not necessarily result in a more favourable outcome for
citizens. In fact, our analysis suggests the exact opposite. Contrary
to our expectations, we found a substantial relationship between
raising a proportionality defence and the dismissal of an appeal. In
other words, raising a proportionality defence makes it more likely
that an appeal will be dismissed.
A possible reason is that local authorities probably refrain from
closing a home if they believe that the closure and its consequences
are not in proportion to the offence committed. The proportionali-
ty principle will hence function as a barrier or threshold for the
local authority to issue a closure order. This presumable role of the
proportionality principle is probably more apparent in cases on
home closures than in cases on the close down of public premises
as the negative consequences of eviction on someone’s life are
immense (Kearns et al., 2000; Nettleton, 2001; Bright, 2010;
Burgard et al., 2012; Currie & Tekin, 2015; Desmond & Kimbro,
2015; Desmond, 2016). This would also explain the differences in
number of closures between public premises and homes as shown
by the survey.
A similar explanation for the relationship between a propor-
tionality defence and the dismissal of an appeal relates to the set-
up of Dutch administrative law procedures. Under Dutch
administrative law, an intermediate stage – the objection
procedure – exists between issuing a closure order and access
to judicial review in which the local authority reconsiders its
closure order. It is possible that local authorities decide to
terminate the closure order if they believe that closing the home
will result in an unfair balance between the purpose of the closure
and the interests of the citizen(s) involved.
Hence, the proportionality principle might ﬁlter out cases that
are evidently disproportionate before issuing a closure order or
during the objection procedure. This could explain why a
proportionality defence does not lead to a successful outcome
for citizens in court; advancing a proportionality defence at such a
late stage might just function as a last straw that citizens grasp to
defend their case.
Another explanation might be that the cases in our sample
mainly involve serious violations with large quantities of cannabis
that justify the outcome of a proportionality review. This suggests
the need for further research involving analyses of more factors
that may relate to the case outcome such as the type and quantity
of discovered drugs.
Nonetheless, current analysis seems to indicate that, once the
case is taken to court, a proportionality review is a procedural
hurdle rather than a substantial safeguard protecting citizens
against the harsh law and order approach that relies on closing
homes.
Conclusion
This study combined doctrinal and empirical legal analyses to
explore and reveal a hidden aspect of the war on drugs in the
Netherlands: the use of home closures to tackle drug-related crime
in residential areas. Although the drug policy in the Netherlands is
known for its tolerance, this paper demonstrated that the Dutch
have developed an aggressive enforcement method against drug-
related crime without bringing criminal law into play. The results
L.M. Bruijn et al. / International Journal of Drug Policy 51 (2018) 137–147 145from the survey showed that only a small portion of the
municipalities in the Netherlands already account for hundreds
of closed premises in 2015. This alternative war on drugs is a
perfect example of how the response to crime has changed into a
culture of control.
While an analysis of the law in the books showed that citizens
have the possibility to request judicial review of administrative
action under both Dutch and European law, the analysis of the law
in action showed that judicial courts do not seem to counter this
repressive approach. Our ﬁndings show that citizens advance a
proportionality defence in the vast majority of all cases and that
raising such defence is likely to impact the case outcome. Yet,
raising a proportionality defence will not result in a more
favourable outcome for citizens and will most likely even result
in the dismissal of the appeal. This seems to indicate that the
judicial proportionality review is of procedural importance rather
than a safety net to protect individual’s rights and interests against
the excessive use of closure orders and following eviction in the
war on drugs.
The ongoing widening of the scope of the closure power, the
approved one strike you are out-policy, relatively low success rate
of citizens who ﬁght the loss of their home, lack of signiﬁcantly
successful defences together with a seemingly meaningless
proportionality check show no sign of a legal safety net against
the loss of one’s home due to drug-related crime at the suit of a
local authority. This makes it hard to believe that the war on drugs
in the Netherlands is sputtering to a close.
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